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NEBRASKA'S STATUTORY RULES OF THE ROAD AND THE 
UNIFORM VEIDCLE CODE: A GENERAL APPRAISAL 
In conjunction and cooperation with the Legislation Com-
mittee of the Nebraska State Bar Association, and the Nebraska 
Department of Roads and Irrigation, a comparative section by 
section analysis and i·eport of act V of the Uniform Vehicle Code 
with the related Nebraska statutes has been made.1 The Uni-
form Vehicle Code consists of five separate acts: Act I-Uni-
form Motor-Vehicle Administration, Registration, Certificate of 
Title, and Antitheft Act; Act II-Uniform Motor-Vehicle Op-
erator's and Chauffeur's License Act; Act III-Uniform Motor-
Vehicle Civil Liability Act; Act IV-Uniform Motor-Vehicle Safe-
ty Responsibility Act; Act V-Uniform Act Regulating Traffic 
on Highways. Of the twenty-one articles contained in act V, only 
the first fifteen were closely analyzed. These fifteen articles 
deal primarily with the regulations commonly ref erred to as the 
"rules of the road." 
Shortly after the statutory analysis was conducted, the Na-
tional Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances com-
pleted a consolidation of the five acts, thereby eliminating any 
40 For an excellent over-all survey of the legal and economic problems 
of fair trade legislation, see Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 175 (1954). 
1 On October 12, 1954 the Committee on Legislation of the Nebraska 
State Bar Association submitted a report to the Bar Association's House 
of Delegates recommending recodification of the highway laws, using as 
a basis act V of the Uniform Vehicle Code. This recommendation was 
unanimously approved by the House. See 34 Neb. L. Rev. 166-172 (rn55). 
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duplicate provisions which theretofor existed in the separate acts. 
Insofar as act V is concerned, only a few minor changes were 
made in the consolidation. Since the provisions relating to the 
rules of the road (and also those provisions relating to accidents 
and accident reports) now found in chapters ten and eleven of 
the consolidated act are in effe~t the same as those provi...ctions 
used in the statutory analysis, the provisions of the Uniform 
Vehicle Code referred to in this article are those contained in the 
former version of act V. 
The Uniform Vehicle Code is the product of compromise 
reached after research was conducted upon the laws of all the 
states and the District of Columbia. Law enforcement officials, 
safety experts, lawyers, judges, motor vehicle administrators, 
traffic engineers and many others participated in discussions of 
the provisions and were responsible for the drafting of the Code 
in its present form. 
The adoption of the Uniform Vehicle Code has been recom-
mended by the American Bar Association, the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, the National Safety Council and by many 
other professional and non-professional groups. It has even 
taken on an international flavor since many motor vehicle laws 
in the Canadian provinces are based upon act V. 
The purpose of this article is, generally, to point out defic-
iencies in the present statutory rules of the road of Nebraska, 
to stimulate thought for future recodification of the rules of the 
road and to give the reader a general comparative appraisal of 
the present statutes with those found in act V of the Uniform 
Vehicle Code. 
The comparative study revealed many similarities and dif-
ferences. It would unduly lengthen this article to discuss each 
point of comparison. Those points which were thought to be 
most relevant have been singled out for discussion in Part IV 
of this article in addition to the general comments found in Part 
III. 
I. PURPOSES OF THE ANALYSIS 
The purposes of the analysis were (1) to determine the 
shortcomings of the present laws relating to the movement of 
traffic; (2) to determine any similarity between Nebraska's 
present laws and those provisions of act V of the Uniform Ve-
hicle Code; (3) to determine which Nebraska statutes should be 
repealed and which statutes should be retained or modified in 
the event that act V is adopted; and (4) to determine whether 
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the provisions of act V would conflict with other Nebraska stat-
utes not i·epealed. 
II. THE UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE IN OTHER STATES 
The most comprehensive state study of act V was conducted 
in New York, following a report by a New York legislative com-
mittee which clearly revealed that the rules of the road in the 
state were in urgent need of revision. After receipt of this re-
port, the New York Legislature adopted a resolution in 1953 
which directed a revision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law in 
accordance with modern traffic and safety needs. 
In response to this resolution, the Joint Legislative Com-
mittee on Motor Vehicle Problems prepared a report consisting 
of a section comparison of the first fifteen articles of act V 
with existing New York law.2 This report not only analyzed 
New York statutes, but also statutes of the other forty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia.3 
Aligning all the states which do or do not have a particular 
section of act V or a substantial portion of it would require more 
detail than would be appropriate here. It is sufficient to state 
2 Modernization of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New 
York Based on the Uniform Vehicle Code, Pt. I, Legis. Doc. No. 36 (1954). 
8 The report compares in table form the various state laws and makes 
the following observation: 
This compilation of statutes is extremely valuable in showing the 
legislators why specific rules should be uniform. For example, 
with respect to passing to the right, our tables show that a motor-
ist must be a master of comparative traffic law if he is to make 
even a short trip from Washington D. C., to New Haven, Connec-
ticut. Since the laws of each state he passes through are dif-
ferent, he never knows from moment to moment what he is 
expected to do or what to expect other drivers to do. It is ob-
vious that great hazards can result from this intolerable sit-
uation .... 
In addition to being valuable for our purposes, the tables throw 
some interesting light on national statutory patterns. They clear-
ly reveal that every time a change was made in the Uniform Ve-
hicle Code, many states which had previously adopted the Code 
failed to enact the amendments. For example, the present pro-
vision of subsection (b) of Section 76 of Act V, covering left 
turns on two-way roadways, was incorporated into Act V in 1945. 
Eighteen states have this new version but fifteen states have re-
tained earlier versions of subsection (b). Eleven states, one of 
which is New York, have provisions contrary to Act V, and only 
three states have no provisions covering left turns. 
Supra note 2, at 13. 
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that more than one-half of the states have adopted all or nearly 
all of act V while most others have adopted substantial parts 
of it. 
III. THE NEBRASKA STATUTES AND THE UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE 
Analysis of the Nebraska statutes revealed, generally, that 
which was also found to be true in the state of New York, i.e., that 
the statutes were p_oorly organized and lacked efficient applica-
tion to modern day traffic problems. More specifically, the an-
alysis may be divided into the following categories: Sequence 
and Orderliness; Ambiguity and Incompleteness; Attempts to 
Change the Nebraska Statutes; Conflicting Provisions; Outdated 
Statutes; Lack of Subject Matter; and Policy Differences. 
A. Sequence and Orderliness 
Act V of the Uniform Vehicle Code has been drafted in a 
manner which presents a logical and orderly sequence requiring 
a minimum of effort to locate provisions on any particular sub-
ject matter. Provisions relating to a particular subject matter, 
such as accidents or right of way, are contained wholly within 
articles appropriately headed and not scattered in several others. 
Contrast this organization with that of the related Nebraska pro-
v1s10ns. For example, in Nebraska the statutes requiring ve-
hicles to stop and also those statutes giving local authorities 
powers to erect traffic signs and devices, establish maximum 
speeds for vehicles, prohibit or limit traffic movement and reg-
ulate parking are scattered throughout article 7 of chapter 39. 
This same disorganization exists in the statutes covering vehicle 
right of way and vehicle speeds, to mention but a few. 
Even one familiar with the present Nebraska statutes could 
easily overlook a relevant provision unless he first makes a dil-
igent search. This point is evidenced by the many hours of 
research which were required to find and analyze only those 
statutes relating to the powers of local authorities.4 
B. Ambiguity and Incompleteness 
Act V of the Uniform Vehicle Code is drafted in clear lan-
guage. The provisions are complete and do not depend upon 
inferences to gain their full meaning. The opposite is true of 
several of Nebraska's statutes. For example, section 39-742 pro-
vides that it is unlawful for more than three persons over the 
4 In 1931 a version of the Uniform Vehicle Code was enacted. This 
enactment now appears as sections 39-741 to 39-799 of the Nebraska stat-
utes. Even the provisions of this act are not grouped by subject matter. 
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age of twelve years to occupy the driver's seat of an automobile, 
but nothing in the' statute limits the number of persons under 
the age of twelve years. 
Section 39-631 provides that the Department of Roads and 
Irrigation shall have exclusive jurisdiction over placing warn-
ing signs, stop signs, and other safety devices on state highways 
routed through cit~es where the population is less than twenty-
five thousand. The inference is that there is not exclusive juris-
diction regarding the placement of signs on state highways routed 
through the cities of Omaha and Lincoln. Present practice shows 
that this inference is acted upon. 
A glaring example of incompleteness of the Nebraska pro-
visions is the definitions section (39-741) in article 7 of chapter 
39. Act V contains fifty-three separate definitions, while Ne-
braska defines only thirteen terms. The definitions section (39-
741), however, applies only to sections 39-741 to 39-799. It might 
be argued, therefore, that the statutes appearing before section 
39-741 (i.e., sections 39-701 to 39-740) and those following (i.e., 
39-7,100 to 39-7,133) are not included. However, in Krepcik v. In-
terstate Transit Lines,5 the Nebraska Supreme Court liberally 
construed the definitions section to cover more than sections 
39-741 to 39-799. The case involved the meaning of a "business 
district" as used in section 39-7,108. This term was defined in 
section 39-741. The court held that the definitions section ap-
plied, reasoning as follows : 
The provision in section 39-7 41 . . . referring to sections 
39-741 to 39-799 was put in the Revised Statutes of 1943 to 
identify the remaining sections of the original act of 1931 in 
lieu of the words "this act". This does not alter the fact that 
section 39-7,108 ... is in effect an amendment of the 1931 act. 
Words defined in a prior statute will be understood in the same 
sense in subsequent statutes unless the contrary appears. . . . 
It necessarily follows that the definitions in the original act apply 
to amendatory sections. There appears no legislative intent to 
the contrary. The definition, then. of "business district" in sec-
tion 39-741 ... applies to the provisions of section 39-7,108 .... G 
Whether a statute is an amendment to the 1931 act must 
be left for court determination. It would seem, therefore, that 
statutes enacted prior to 1931 could not qualify. Act V would 
not present this problem since it contains no reference to specific 
sections to be covered by the definitions. It would be applicable 
to all sections presently in existence and to any subsequently 
added. 
u 154 Neb. 39, 48 N.W.2d 839 (1951). 
6 Id. at 679. 680, 48 N.W.2d at 844. 
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Some of the present ambiguous statutes ref er to important 
subjects. For example, section 39-742 provides that vehicles shall 
stop upon approaching a place where passengers are getting on 
or off school buses. What is meant by the term "approaching"? 
Does it mean that vehicles must stop both when meeting and 
passing a school bus? Does the provision apply to vehicles op-
erated on four-lane highways or divided highways? The in-
creasing use of school buses in the expanding school systems to-
gether with the tremendous growth of vehicular travel has in-
creased the need for legislation covering the dangers presented 
by school buses traveling and stopping on high speed roadways. 
One further example of an incomplete provision is section 
39-751 which provides only that a driver shall yield the right 
of way to a pedestrian who is crossing a highway within a clearly 
marked crosswalk or to a pedestrian who crosses at an inter-
section within the prolongation of the lateral boundary lines of 
the adjacent sidewalks at the end of a block; at all other places 
the pedestrian is to yield the right of way to vehicles on the 
highways. This statute does not provide for the regulation of 
pedestrians who walk along the sides of highways or pedestrians 
who solicit rides from passing motorists. Further, the statute 
does not require that drivers exercise due care and caution when 
observing children or incapacitated persons on or near the high-
way. 
C. Attempts to Change the Nebraska Statutes 
Many of the present statutes were adopted in 1933 or be-
fore. When these statutes were adopted, motor vehicles did not 
create the difficult problems of traffic control that they create 
today. The increased use of motor vehicles, higher speed rates, 
and better road networks have created problems which must 
be regulated by modern-day statutes. To a large extent the 
changes which have been made to improve Nebraska's statutes 
have been accomplished by piecemeal amendments rather than 
through comprehensive analysis and redrafting. This patchwork 
method has produced several deficiencies, for the correction of 
which further patchwork legislation has been required. 
For example, section 39-723 establishes a speed limit of 
sixty miles per hour. Before a 1953 amendment, section 39-725 
(the penalty section) directly referred to section 39-723 (the 
speed provisions). However, the amended law made no ref-
erence to section 39-723. Section 39-7,127, a "catch-all" statute, 
provides penalties for violations of laws relating to the operation 
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of motor vehicles where no specific penalty is provided.7 The 
"catch-all" penalty statute (section 39-7,127) was not the equiv-
alent of the old penalty section (39-725). For example, the old 
penalty section (39-725) provided for a fine of not less than 
ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars or thirty days im-
prisonment or both. For a first offense section 39-7,127 pro-
vides the same penalty except that fifty dollars is the maximum 
fine. And section 39-725, prior to its amendment, contained no 
distinction between a first and subsequent violation. Further 
amendment by the 1955 session of the Legislature was necessary 
to clear any doubt on this subject.8 Section 39-7,127 was amend-
ed to apply to violations of section 39-723, and for a first viola-
tion the maximum fine was raised to one hundred dollars. 
Another illustration of a possible hiatus created by piecemeal 
statutory treatment is found in the penalty provision for trucks 
which violate the provision prohibiting a load greater than twen-
ty percent heavier than that for which a registration fee !!as 
been paid (section 39-723.03). Until 1953, section 39-723.05 pro-
vided a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one hun-
dred dollars, and in addition it provided for a revocation of the 
vehicle license upon the third conviction. A 1953 amendment 
to section 39-723.05 expressly provides a penalty for the first 
and second offenses of not less than ten dollars and not more 
than one hundred dollars if the operator violates the load limit 
mentioned above. It might be doubted whether an operator who 
violates the statute for the third, the fourth, or the fifth time 
may be fined and whether his vehicle license may be revoked 
since the statute, as amended, is silent upon these points. 
D. Conflicting Provisions 
The analysis revealed a few inconsistent prov1s1ons in the 
Nebraska statutes. Section 39-729 confers power upon the De-
partment of Roads and Irrigation to devise and supervise the 
manufacture and erection of stop signs, red flares, traffic sig-
nals, traffic lights, or warning signs, and, where necessary, to 
7 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-7,127 (Reissue 1952) provides: "Any person who 
shall violate any of the provisions of sections 39-726, 39-7,108 to 39-7,112 
and 39-7,115 to 39-7,117, or any other law of this state relating to the 
operation of motor vehicles, shall, e:xcept as otherwise specifically pro-
vided ... be punished as follows .... " Since § 39-725 no longer "speci-
fically" provides a penalty for a violation of § 39-723, the latter relating 
to "the operation of a motor vehicle,'" then, § 39-7 ,127 should apply and 
it was held to apply in Hyslop v. State, 159 Neb. 802, 68 N.W.2d 698 
(1955). 
SNeb. Laws c. 155 (1955). 
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erect them on state highways and at railroad crossings upon state 
highways. Section 39-631 grants the Department exclusive jur-
isdiction as to stop signs, warning signs or other safety devices 
to be erected and maintained on state highways routed through 
cities of less than 25,000 inhabitants. However, section 39-631 
also provides that such signs shall be placed on any highway 
within a city having a population of more than 2,500 inhabitants 
only after due notice and consultation by the Department with 
city officials. This limitation is not found in section 39-729. Clar-
ification is needed to define with more certainty those powers 
of the Department relating to erection and maintenance of signs 
or other traffic devices on state highways without and within 
corporate city limits. 
Another inconsistency exists between sections 39-742 and 39-
755. Section 39-742 provides that a vehicle must stop when ap-
proaching a place where passengers are boarding or descending 
from streetcars. Section 39-755 also requires a full stop but pro-
vides exceptions where safety zones are established or where traf-
fic at an intersection is controlled by an officer or traffic lights. 
E. Outdated Statutes 
At the present time there are many Nebraska statutes which 
are literally worthless because of automotive changes, integrated 
road networks and added vehicular travel. Good examples of 
these statutes are: (1) section 39-701, which deals with leav-
ing horses and mules unhitched upon the highways; (2) sections 
39-708 to 39-712 relating to camping upon the highways; and 
(3) section 39-718, which pertains to carriages meeting on the 
roads of the state. 
Any carefully planned recodification of the present rules of 
the road should eliminate these obsolete statutes. Act V of the 
Uniform Vehicle Code contains only provisions which are applic-
able to present-day traffic needs. As any of the provisions of 
the Uniform Vehicle Code become obsolete or are no longer ade-
quate to cope with traffic problems, new provisions drafted only 
after exhaustive research are recommended to the states for adop-
tion. This relieves the states of a large amount of research which 
otherwise would be necessary. 
F. Lack of Subject Matter 
Probably the most critical deficiency in the Nebraska pro-
visions is insufficient coverage of subject matter. In plain words, 
the present rules of the road do not regulate many situations 
which have arisen as a result of increased vehicular travel. The 
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present statutes are almost totally lacking in the following sub-
jects: (1) traffic on divided highways, controlled access high-
ways, and multiple lane undivided highways; (2) motor-driven 
cycles and bicycles ; ( 3) traffic regulations for school buses; 
(4) traffic signal legends; and (5) regulations defining pedes-
trians' rights and duties. 
Some of the present statutes briefly ref er to important topics 
but fall short of adequate coverage. For example, section 39-788 
provides that it shall be unlawful to drive any vehicle upon a 
highway with a red or green light visible from the front but 
such section shall not apply to police or fire patrol vehicles. It 
would appear that ambulances are not permitted to display red 
warning lights. 
Another example of insufficient coverage of a topic is in 
relation to duties placed upon a driver involved in an accident. 
Sections 39-762 and 39-762.01 provide that a driver who is in-
volved in an accident resulting ju personal injury, death, or prop-
erty damage shall stop at the scene of the accident, render aid 
if necessary, and give certain information. Unlike act V, the 
present statutes place no duty upon a driver to give immediate 
notice of an accident to law enforcement officials. 
G. Policy Differences 
The analysis revealed that act V and the related Nebraska 
statutes have some general policy differences. 
Act V would give the state authorities almost exclusive con-
trol of the state highways for all purposes relating to the regula-
tion of traffic; whereas, present Nebraska laws give local au-
thorities power, though limited, to place signs, traffic signals, 
and speed limits ·o:µ highways routed through municipalities. The 
policy behind act V visualizes the state as a more efficient body 
to provide for traffic regulation where the traffic problems of 
the entire state are considered, a point well taken where the state 
contains large cities and numerous congested highways. This 
argument loses some of its vigor when applied to Nebraska, how-
ever. In this state there are only two cities which approach 
metropolitan size. All other cities are relatively small and have 
no seriously congested traffic areas. Because of this, an argu-
ment can be made in favor of allowing a city some voice in reg-
ulating traffic upon state highways extending through its cor-
porate limits. An optional provision of act V would impose a 
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duty upon the state to erect and maintain traffic control devices 
on county roads.9 
Present Nebraska statutes provide for channeling accident 
reports through local police departments if a city ordinance so 
requires ; otherwise, such reports are sent directly to a state 
agency.10 Act V would require that all such reports be sent to 
a state agency.11 The advantage of the present system is that 
police officials have an opportunity to collect data relating to 
accidents within their jurisdiction without having to resort to 
separate and different reports. The advantage in the use of the 
system under act V is that the state agency is assured of a more 
prompt receipt of the accident report. 
As stated in the preceding section, act V places more specific 
duties upon a driver involved in an accident than do the present 
statutes. This has been done in an effort to safeguard more 
adequately the rights of property owners by requiring that the 
driver involved in the accident give immediate notice to law en-
forcement officials as well as to property owners and injured 
persons. 
9 Uniform Vehicle Code, act V, § 3l(a) (1952) provides, "The (State 
Highway Commission) shall place and maintain such traffic-control de-
vices, conforming to its manual and specifications, upon all State (and 
county) highways as it shall deem necessary to indicate and to carry out 
the provisions of this act or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic." 
10 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-505 (1) (Supp. 1953) provides: 
The operator of every motor vehicle which is in any manner in-
volved in an accident within this state, in which any person is 
killed or injured or in which damage •.. in excess of one hundred 
dollars is sustained to the property of any one person, including 
such ope)."ator, shall within ten days report the matter in writ-
ing to the department ... [Roads and Irrigation], except when 
a report is made as provided in section 39-764 or 60-505.01 to 
the local police or police headquarters of a city or village. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-505.01 (Supp. 1953) provides: 
When any city or village by ordinance requires reports of ac-
cidents to be filed with local police or police headquarters, such 
police or police headquarters shall within forty-eight hours after 
receiving such a report, or making a report, send a copy of such 
report to the Department of Roads and Irrigation if the amount 
of damage to the property of any one person, including such oper-
ator, is . . . in excess of one hundred dollars or if injuries to 
any person or the death of any person resulted from such accident. 
11 Uniform Vehicle Code, act V, § 45(a) (1952) provides: "The driver 
of a vehicle (or streetcar) which is in any manner involved in an accident 
resulting in bodily injury to or death of a person or total property damage 
to an apparent extent of $25 ($50, $100) or more shall, within 5 days 
after such accident, forward a written report of such accident to the de-
partment. (Revised 1952)." 
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In many cases fines and prison or jail sentences are more 
severe in Nebraska than those in act V, especially for the more 
serious offenses such as motor vehicle homicide, reckless and 
willful reckless driving, and drunk driving. Several sections of 
act V authorize revocation of a driver's license but do not spec-
ify the duration of the period of revocation.12 The Nebraska 
statutes contain a number of provisions which authorize revoca-
tion of licenses and ordinarily prescribe the length of time the 
license will remain revoked.13 
Penalties for violations of Nebraska statutes are often 
found within the same statute14 or in a separate statute which 
refers to one or a group of statutes.11.' Except for special pen-
alties imposed upon a conviction for negligent homicide, driv-
ing while intoxicated, and reckless driving, act V treats all viola-
tions as misdemeanors, and imposes the same penalty. 
Section 39-741 (5) of the present statutes defines the term 
"highway" as "every way or place of whatever nature open to 
the use of the public . . . but shall not be deemed to include a 
roadway or driveway upon grounds owned by . . . colleges, uni-
versities or other institutions." The reason for excluding road-
ways on grounds owned by "colleges, universities or other in-
stitutions" is that under the state administrative organization, 
agencies other than the Department of Roads and Irrigation have 
supervisory powers over various state owned grounds, including 
the roadways thereon. Because of this, separate statutes pro-
vide for speeds, right of way for traffic, and erection and main-
tenance of traffic signs on such roadways.16 Section 14 (a) of 
act V defines a "street or highway" as "the entire width between 
the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any 
part is open to the use of the public . . . ." Act V draws no dis-
tinction between roadways on grounds of "colleges, universities 
or other institutions." If act V is adopted, a decision '.must be 
made whether the various state agencies are to relinquish their 
12 Uniform Vehicle Code, act V, § 53 (c) (1952), a typical illustration, 
reads: "The commissioner shall revoke the license or permit to drive 
and any nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negli-
gent homicide.'' 
13 For example, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-7,106 (Reissue 1952) and § 
39-723.05(2) (Supp, 1953). 
H Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-706 (Reissue 1952) is typical. It provides: 
"Whoever shall plow up or upon any public highway without the con-
sent or direction of the overseer of roads shall be fined not less than five 
dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars.'' 
i::; See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-725 (Supp. 1953). 
l(l See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-736 to 39-738 (Reissue 1952). 
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present control over such roadways and place such roadways in 
the same category as any other highway for traffic regulation 
purposes. 
Section 39-738 of the present statutes confers power upon 
the Department of Roads and Irrigation, when the officials of a 
state institution shaH so request, to devise and supeTVise the erec-
tion of stop signs, slow signs, or warning signs on roadways 
through, along or within the grounds of the , institution. The 
officials of an institution may be in the best position to judge 
the needs for traffic safety within the grounds. This is the 
basis for the requirement that such officials first initiate a re-
quest for traffic signs. Section 39-737 provides that the rate of 
speed for vehicles operated on any "road, avenue or boulevard" 
running within, through or along the grounds of a state insti-
tution shall be reasonable and proper. The rates of speed de-
clared to be lawful in other statutes do not apply to these road-
ways. Regardless of whether the distinction between ordinary 
highways and roadways on grounds of st.ate institutions is re-
moved in the event that act V is adopted, it is difficult to fore-
see any real difficulties which should disrupt an efficient method 
of regulating traffic on state institutional roadways. 
The Nebraska statutes prohibit careless driving,1i reckless 
driving,18 and willful reckless driving.19 The reason for the dis-
tinction drawn in these statutes is that each is designed for ap-
plication to a standard of driving conduct depending upon the 
gravity of the violation. As a result of these distinctions, a pros-
ecutor may choose to prosecute under one statute rather than 
another because the facts of his case may warrant a greater 
or lesser penalty. Act V does not allow a prosecutor such a 
choice because the act provides only for the offense of reckless 
driving.20 A disadvantage of this single offense is that a viola-
tion by one driver may be much less flagrant than that of another 
and yet the stigma of the term "reckless driving" will attach 
equally to both. 
IV. RECOl\Il\IENDED CHANGES 
A set of uniform laws recommended to the states for adop-
17 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-616 (Reissue 1952); cf. Neb. Laws c. 146 (1955) 
(slight changes in wording). 
18 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-7 ,107 (Reissue 1952). 
19 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-7,107.02 (Reissue 1952). 
20 Uniform Vehicle Code, act V, § 55 (a) (1952). "Any person who 
drives any vehicle in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of per-
sons or property is guilty of reckless driving." 
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tion seldom fits the exact needs of a particular state. This would 
be especially true where driving laws are concerned since each 
state's highway system and highway administration system are 
unique. It was not surprising that the detailed report of the one 
hundred and twenty-nine sections of act V which were analyzed 
showed that thirty-three sections had recommendations other than 
"Adopt UVC." The following recommendations were made to 
the Legislation Committee of the Nebraska State Bar Association. 
A. Minor Changes for Clarity 
Fifteen of the sections not recommended for adoption re-
quired only minor changes for clarity, omitted provisions, terms 
to fit appropriate state agencies, and terminology to harmonize 
with the other statutes.21 None of these fifteen changes would 
21 The following sections of the Uniform Vehicle Code were recommend-
ed with minor modifications: (1) § 2(e): the definition of "authorized 
emergency vehicle" would be amended to allow state authorities to de-
clare certain vehicles as "authorized emergency vehicles" if the need 
should arise. ( 2) § 10 (a) : the provision would be amended to change 
the term "commissioner" to "State Engineer.'' (3) § ll(c): the defin-
ition of the term "driver" would be amended to include one who con-
trols a vehicle by electronic device. ( 4) § 14 (a) : the definition of "street 
or highway" would be amended to exclude roadways upon grounds of 
state institutions if it is deemed advisable to retain the present statutory 
distinction found in § 39-741(5) of the present laws. (5) § 18(b): the 
definition of "business district" would be amended to clarify the mean-
ing regarding the required number of feet for frontage contiguous to 
a highway. (6) § 25.1: the definition of "authorized emergency vehicle" 
would be amended to include "conservation vehicles." (7) § 34: a 
provision relating to the use of colored traffic lights would be amended 
to insure proper sequence of colored lights for traffic movement. ( 8) § 
37: a provision relating to displaying unauthorized signs would be amended 
to permit the organization making or authorizing the sign to have its 
name placed thereon. (9) § 41: a provision requiring a driver to give 
information and render aid to those involved in an accident would be 
amended to include giving the same type of information to an investi-
gating law officer. (10) § 47.1: a provision providing a penalty for 
failing to make a written report of an accident would be amended to 
provide that the one reporting would be required to give correct in-
formation on such report. (11) § 48: a provision requiring that cor-
oners submit monthly reports of traffic deaths would be amended to 
place the date of submitting such report on a date which is convenient 
for the receiving state agency. (12) § 69: a provision which gives state 
authorities power to determine those portions of any highway on which 
no-passing signs may be erected would be amended to permit local au-
thorities to designate such portions of highway under their jurisdiction 
and to erect signs thereon. ( 13) § 7 9: a provision requiring an arm 
signal when intending to stop a vehicle would be amended so such signal 
would not be necessary at a traffic stop signal or at a place where a 
traffic officer signals that a stop be made. ( 14) § 112: a provision pro-
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disrupt to any significant extent the desired uniformity. 
B. Jurisdiction over Traffic Control Devices 
(1) Cities of less than twenty-five thousand 
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The adoption of sections 28 (b), 31 (b), 58 ( d), 69 and 113 ( c) 
depends upon whether the Legislature will repeal or modify sec-
tion 39-631 of the present statutes. This section gives state au-
thorities exclusive jurisdiction over warning signs, stop signs 
and safety devices located on state highways routed through cities 
and villages of less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants. The 
five sections of act V will conflict with this section unless it is 
modified. 
(2) County roads 
Section 31 places upon state authorities the duty of main-
taining traffic control devices upon all state and county roads 
and no local authority may place or maintain such devices on 
roadways under its jurisdiction without permission from state 
authorities. Section 32 (a) provides that local authorities in their 
respective jurisdictions shall place and maintain such traffic 
control devices under their jurisdiction as deemed necessary. 
However, section 32(b) (an optional provision) provides that the 
local authorities referred to in section 32(a) shall be subject to 
the direction and control of state authorities. That part of sec-
tion 31 which gives state authorities the duty to maintain traf-
fic control devices on county roads should be deleted. Nebraska 
has many miles of these roads, and the proposed provision of 
act V would require that the Department of Roads and Irrigation 
be responsible for knowing all the danger points upon such roads 
and for giving notice of them by proper signs. Maintenance of 
these roads by the county places the county in a better position 
to judge safety needs. 
(3) State control over erection of traffic devices by 
local authorities 
Optional provision (b) of section 32 would vest in the De-
hibiting parking in certain areas would be amended to cover the situa-
tion where there are no sidewalks at intersections. In such a case there 
is not a fixed point from which to measure back along the curb line 
for parking distances. It was recommended that property or curb line 
intersections be used as the fixed point. ( 15) § 122: a provision relating 
to regulations of school buses would be amended to require written notice 
in that part of the provision wherein it requires that notice be given 
from a school board to a school bus driver that the latter's contract is 
canceled because of a breach of contract. 
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partment of Roads and Irrigation authority to direct and con-
trol location and number of traffic control devices which might 
be erected by local authorities. This may be objectionable to 
some local authorities although it is recognized that in certain 
instances local authorities having a free hand in this matter have 
erected such numbers of regulatory signs and signals as to un-
duly delay traffic and invite disobedience by the motoring public. 
This optional provision was not recommended for adoption part-
ly on the grounds that it takes away a primary function of muni-
cipal government and partly because most Nebraska cities (ex-
cept Lincoln and Omaha) are relatively small and any serious 
local problem could be remedied by the municipality. 
C. Restrictions Which May Not Fit Nebraska's Needs 
It was recommended that sections 56, 58 ( d), 60, 72, 105, and 
109.5 of act V be closely analyzed by the Traffic Engineering 
Division of the Department of Roads and Irrigation because it 
may be that these sections impose driving restrictions which do 
not fit the particular needs of Nebraska. Changes in these sec-
tions would involve speeds for vehicles outside cities and vil-
lages,22 prima facie speed limits within cities and villages, speeds 
for motor-driven cycles, distances to be maintained when follow-
ing vehicles, stops for school busses, and certain stops at rail-
road crossings. 
D. Penalties and License Revocation 
It was recommended that the penalties for violation of sec-
tions 39 and 53 be referred to the Legislature for study. Sec-
tion 39, which compels any driver involved in an accident to stop 
when injury or death occurs therefrom, has a less severe penalty 
than the present statute, section 39-763. 
Section 53 relates to negligent homicide while operating a 
motor vehicle. Section 28-403.01 of the Nebraska statutes pro-
vides that whoever shall be deemed guilty of motor vehicle homi-
cide shall be punished by (1) a fine not exceeding five hundred 
dollars, (2) imprisonment in the county jail for a period not to 
exceed six months, (3) imprisonment in the penitentiary for a 
period not less than one year nor more than ten years, or (4) 
both such fine and imprisonment. Section 53 (b) of act V pro-
vides that "any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine 
22 Uniform Vehicle Code, act V, § 56 would place a maximum speed 
of fifty miles per hour on highways outside business or residence dis-
tricts during the daytime and forty-five miles per hour during nighttime. 
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of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment." This imprisonment penalty barely puts neg-
ligent homicide within the category of a felony. The Nebraska 
Legislature has seen fit to prescribe a very severe penalty for 
this offense. One factor which must be considered in providing 
a penalty for this offense is that such penalty must be one which 
prosecutors will use with some degree of assurance that a con-
viction may be obtained. It cannot be doubted that there is 
feeling among many people that the possibility of a person being 
imprisoned for ten years for a violation of this statute is shock-
ing. Undoubtedly this springs from the belief that almost every-
one who drives a vehicle may be involved in an accident for which 
he is at least partly to blame. Opposition springing from this 
attitude can well prevent the statute being applied with vigor 
regardless of the fact that some person has lost his life upon the 
highways.23 
Both sections 39 ( c) and 53 ( c), relating to revocation of 
operators' licenses, should be amended to provide a definite dur-
ation for the period of revocation. Otherwise it would be pos-
sible to withhold the license indefinitely. 
E. Admission of Accident Reports in Evidence 
Section 50 of act V, relating to accident reports, provides, 
as does section 39-764 of the present statutes, that such reports 
may not be introduced as evidence in any civil or criminal trial 
except to prove a compliance or noncompliance with the law re-
quiring submission of such reports. Under the present statutes, 
inadmissibility of accident reports as evidence hampers enforce-
ment of the financial responsibility law. If the person reporting 
damage in excess of one hundred dollars (or an accident which 
caused a personal injury) cannot meet the requirements of the 
financial responsibility law, he receives a notice that his oper-
ator's license will be suspended unless he makes a security de-
posit in the amount stated in the notice.24 If he fails to comply, 
the director of financial responsibility sends him a notice that 
his operator's license has been suspended. The operator may 
challenge this action of suspension in a district court.2:; Sus-
pension depends upon whether the accident resulted in injury 
or death or whether there was property damage to an apparent 
extent of over one hundred dollars. Use of the accident reports 
at trial to prove a basis for the director's action is a violation 
23 See Note, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 456 (1954). 
24 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-507 (Supp. 1953). 
25 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-503 (Reissue 1952). 
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of section 39-764. To obtain other proof of the amount of the 
damage requires that the Attorney General, who must defend 
the action against the director, make a diligent investigation of 
the damage in each action. Limited time and lack of personnel 
to conduct investigations of this type preclude the Attorney Gen-
eral from performing this function. The result is that the op-
erator cannot be deprived of his license since the director is un-
able to prove the basis for the suspension. 
It was suggested that a provision be made in section 50 of 
act V that the court may direct that the accident report be pro-
duced. After examining the report, the court would state for the 
record whether certain statements contained therein provided a 
proper basis for the director's action. The Nebraska constitu-
tional provision against compelling any person to give evidence 
against himself in any criminal case would appear not to con-
flict with the above suggested provision since the court action 
is one instigated by the operator and not the state. 
F. Statutory Presumption of Drunkenness 
Section 54 relates to persons under the influence of intoxica-
ting liquor or drugs. The present Nebraska statute, section 39-
727 .0l, provides for certain statutory presumptions of drunken-
ness based upon alcoholic content of the body fluid. It also pro-
vides that a presumption of guilt shall not arise against one who 
refuses to submit to a test designed to calculate the alcoholic 
content. 
This latter provision seems to indicate that consent by the 
accused would be necessary to admit as evidence the results of 
any test of a specimen of the accused's body fluid for alcoholic 
content, although the provision does not specifically so state. If 
this latter provision were deleted from the statute, it would then 
appear that consent is not necessary for the use of the results 
of a test for alcohol as evidence to prove drunkenness. Taking 
a sample of body fluid for an alcohol test when the accused is 
incapable of giving consent involves the question of violation of 
the rights of the accused against self-incrimination. The present 
trend in the law is to draw a distinction between information 
elicited by "word of mouth" and information which comes by 
way of scientific analysis even though it is the accused's body 
fluid that provides the substance to be analyzed.26 The latter 
type of information is held not to be self-incriminating, i.e., the 
26 See Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1514 (1940); 159 A.L.R. 209 (1945); 164 
A.L.R. 967 (1946); 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952). 
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giving of evidence against oneself, because it is not derived from 
statements which are controlled by the thought process of the 
accused. It is, rather, the results of scientific analysis which 
provide the information. 
Section 54 of act V contains the same statutory presump-
tions of drunkenness based upon the alcoholic content of the 
blood, but the section does not have a provision that a presump-
tion shall not arise from a person's refusing to submit to a blood 
test. If section 54 were adopted, the questions of necessity of 
consent, and of self-incrimination would be thrown open for lit-
igation. For this reason the adoption of section 54 was not rec-
ommended. 
G. Reckless Driving 
Section 55 of act V relates only to the offense of "reckless 
driving." Nebraska has a similar statute and also separate pro-
visions for the off ens es of careless driving and willful reckless 
driving. The purpose of the three separate provisions, as out-
lined earlier in this article, was to avoid attaching the stigma of 
"reckless driver" to all, regardless of the degree of their lack 
of care. For this reason, it was recommended that the present 
statute, with minor modification, be retained. 
H. Duty to Lock Ignition 
Section 114 of act V would place a duty upon a driver of a 
vehicle to lock the ignition and remove the key. Such a provis-
ion could cause a harsh result in that failure to comply with the 
statute might provide the basis for a finding that the driver is 
negligent when his vehicle is wrongfully taken and later involved 
in an accident. Application of the doctrine of negligence per se 
to this situation would render inapplicable the common law rules 
regarding foreseeability of risk. 
Statutes requiring that a driver set his hand brakes and 
turn his vehicle's wheels toward the curb when pa1·king are per-
fectly reasonable because of the inherent risk that the vehicle 
may move and cause injury to person and property. Resulting 
damages can be traced to the driver's personal negligence. How-
ever, a statute prohibiting the leaving of ignition keys in a ve-
hicle and thereby providing a wrongdoer an opportunity to steal 
the vehicle which later produces an injury seems remote and per-
haps unreasonable in comparison. This section was not recom-
mended for adoption. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is hoped that the report which this article summarizes 
will be of help to those in this state who are trying to make our 
roads safer. The study of Nebraska laws pertaining to the rules 
of the road demonstrated a real need for recodification. There 
is no reason to doubt that similar studies in other states would 
support substantially the same conclusion. It would be desirable 
for other states to reexamine their statutes as Nebraska has 
done, and to consider adoption of those parts of the Uniform 
Vehicle Code which fit their traffic conditions. Through this 
technique possibly some degree of uniformity may result. 
Lawrence L. Wilson* 
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